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I. INTRODUCTION
While the French and Americans have had longstanding cultural
differences, on core values they have a strong tradition of congruence. This
correspondence is perhaps best represented by the Statue of Liberty,
designed by French sculptor Fr~d~ric Auguste Bartholdi and given by
France to the United States in 1889. The statue symbolizes freedom, a key
republican virtue in politics and doubtless the most important ingredient in
contract formation.
This article examines recent court decisions and legal commentary
to consider a special intersection in the French and American law of
contracts-franchising. Indeed, the franchise concept is closely tied to
freedom of contract, and the term "franchise" is derived from a French
word for "freedom." 2 After comparing the legal frameworks of the two
nations' franchise contract law, the article focuses on issues involving pre-
contract formation requirements as well as contract performance standards
insofar as they concern territorial encroachment.
In France, just a few decades into the 20th Century, the ancestor of
the modem franchise system appeared. In the 1930s, a company called "La
Laini&e de Roubaix" developed the new type of distribution under a trade
name still famous in France to this day, Pingouin.3
Despite these French roots from before World War II, franchising
actually hit its full developmental stride when it blossomed in the United
States of America during the mid 20th Century. The automobile industry-
not only the sale of cars, but also gasoline distribution-was the first sector
to develop under the new supply arrangements. The franchise concept soon
spread to many other sectors of the American economy, even to such niche
areas as catering and tool rentals. Eventually, prominent industry and
service names such as Ford, General Motors and Kentucky Fried Chicken
adopted the franchise system. Thus, in half a century, from 1920 to 1970,
2 The word "franchise" comes from the Middle Ages. The French word "franc" was
used to designate the acknowledgement of a privilege. Therefore, villages that were
allowed the use of a privilege normally reserved for the lords were called "ville-
franches" or "franc towns." Minist&re des Petites et Moyennes Entreprises, du
Commerce, de l'Artisanat et des Professions Lib~rales, Small and Middle Businesses,
Trade, Craft Industry and Liberal Professions, La Franchise en 10 questions (the
franchise in 10 questions), http://www.pme.gouv.fr/informations/guide-
com/telechar/franchise/franchise.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2009).
3 For a long time, Pingouin remained the most important franchisor in France.
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franchising had obtained the credibility and fame needed to ensure some
success, whether homegrown or as a foreign transplant, outside the borders
of the United States.
In the 1960s and 1970s, the franchise system returned to France,
where it has continued to have probably its strongest presence-
economically, culturally, and legally-in all of Europe.4 The number of
franchisors and, therefore, of franchisees, would multiply in just a few
years; indeed, the number of networks increased from 34 (with about 2,000
franchisees) in 1971, to 203 (with about 10,700 franchisees) in 1979.5 This
increase happened, however, almost too hastily; franchise professionals, as
well as the public, quickly felt the need to include franchising in the
country's developing jurisprudence. Today, as we count about 1141
franchise networks in France,6 we may see that figure as a reflection of
American influence, even though certainly the scales of economy and the
cultures are different. Indeed, in the United States, there are roughly 1,500
franchisors.7  Overall, the large size of both French and American
franchising as well as the growth of each country's case law permit us, in
this article, first to analyze and contrast the legal landscapes, including
basic definitions,8 for the franchise contract in France and in the United
States. We then can observe French trends insofar as they reflect American
franchise practices, with a specific focus on the issues of territorial
encroachment, exclusivity clauses, and the transfer or assignment of
franchise contracts. In exploring the possible causes of a French decline in
exclusivity, we examine, compare, and explain recent striking trends in
both France and the United States.
4 According to the European Franchise Federation, France is the largest franchising
market in Europe, both in total sales and in number of franchise networks (franchisors).
Rose Marie Faria, France Serves as a Gateway to Europe,
http://www.franchise.orz/Franchise-News-Detail.aspx?id=33190 (last visited Mar. 14,
2009).
5 DoMtNQuE BASCHET, LA FRANCHISE: GUIDE JURIDIQUE - CONSEILS PRATIQUES 31
(2005).
6 The French Franchise Federation, Les chiffres de la franchise en 2007 (Franchise
figures for 2007), 1, http://www.franchise-fff.comIMG/pdf/La franchise 2007.pdf.
See also C CSA Institute, http://www.csa-fr.com/accueil.asp (a survey institute in
France, issuing its survey results on its web site) (last visited Mar. 14, 2009). CCSA
institute, http://www.franchise-fff.com/L-enquete-annuelle-Banque,144.html (a briefing
of the survey result). Info Franchise.com,
http://64.233.169.104/search?q=cache: BPfPRR 1K09oJ:www.infofranchise.com/detail.c
fm%3FIdNotizia%3D8120%26ldSezione%3D I 8%26strKev%3Dcom+number+of+fran
chise+network+in+the+USA&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=10&gl=us (last visited Mar. 14,
2009).
7 World Franchise Council,
http://www.worldfranchisecouncil.orp-/control/product?product id=FC US (World
Franchise Council, figures for United States) (last visited Mar. 14, 2009).
8 Dictionnaire Permanent Droit des Affaires 1363 (May 2, 2006).
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II. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE FOR FRANCHISE CONTRACTS IN
FRANCE AND IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Defining the Franchise Contract in France and in the United States
1. France
Franchise Contracts and Territoriality
In France, the franchise contract is defined9 as a contract by which
a person, the franchisor, grants to another person, the franchisee (an
independent business party), its own distinctive signs and an original
technical or commercial "savoir-faire,"' 0 i.e., know-how, in consideration
9 The Franchise European Code of Ethics, Article 1, Code de deontologie europden de
lafranchise, available at http://www.franchise-
fff.com/IMG/pdf/Code deontologie NB-2.pdf.
The definition of a franchise is not found in Commission Regulation 2790/99, On the
Application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty Establishing the European Community to
Categories of Vertical Agreements and Concerted Practices (Vertical Restraints Block
Exemption Regulation), 1999 O.J. (L. 336) (EC). However, the guidelines to that
regulation specifically discuss examples of franchising and refer to the essential
elements of a franchise.
Franchise agreements contain licenses of intellectual property rights relating
in particular to trademarks or signs and know-how for the use and distribution of goods
or services. In addition to the license of IPRs, the franchisor usually provides the
franchisee during the life of the agreement with commercial or technical assistance. The
license and the assistance are integral components of the business method being
franchised. The franchisor is in general paid a franchise fee by the franchisee for the use
of the particular business method.
Commission Guidelines on Vertical Restraints (EC), 13 Oct. 2000, art. 2.5 (para. 199),
O.J. (C. 291). These guidelines mention the components of franchising as outlined in
the now-superseded European Block Exemption on Franchises, which "still provide[s] a
good expression of the general understanding of a franchise in France" (Rdmi Delforge
& Henri-Xavier Ortoli, France, in INTERNATIONAL FRANCHISE SALES LAWS, FR- 1, FR-6
(2008, eds. Andrew P. Loewinger & Michael K. Lindsey). Commission Regulation
4087/88 of 30 November 1988 on the Application of Article 85 (3) of the European
Treaty to Categories of Franchise Agreements, O.J. (L 359) 46-52 (EEC, 28 Dec.
1988). In particular, the superseded exemption defined a franchise as "a package of
industrial or intellectual property rights relating to trademarks, trade names, shop signs,
utility models, designs, copyrights, know-how or patents, to be exploited for the resale
of goods or the provision of services to end users." Id. at art. 1(3)(a). It then further
delineates the concepts by defining a franchise agreement as:
an agreement whereby one undertaking, the franchisor,
grants the other, the franchisee, in exchange for direct or indirect
financial consideration, the right to exploit a franchise for the
purposes of marketing specified types of goods and/or services; it
includes at least obligations relating to:
- the use of a common name or shop sign and a uniform
presentation of contract premises and/or means of transport,
- the communication by the franchisor to the franchisee of
know-how,
- the continuing provision by the franchisor to the
franchisee of commercial or technical assistance during the life of
the agreement.
Id. at art. l(3)(b).10 Cass. com., July 8, 1997, n' 95-17.232, Std Descamps c/St6 Axia 3000. This was a
case of the Chambre Commerciale et Financire, a section -the Commercial and
Financial Chamber-of the Cour de Cassation.
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for a royalty. 1 The franchisee has to use this transferred savoir-faire under
the franchisor's control and with his assistance. 12 The French franchise
agreement generally will include provisions setting the price of entry rights
and royalties, establishing the length of the franchise term, stating the
organization of training, controlling the use of the brand and the trade
name, covering site selection, discussing the management of advertisements
and of any commercial assistance, detailing territorial rights or restrictions,
mandating confidentiality and noncompetition, delineating grounds for or
guidelines about termination and transfer, and setting forth the controlling
law. 3
The French franchise contract has the particularity of being a
commercial contract entered into intuitu personae.'4 This Latin phrase has
been defined as "en fonction de la personne" (depending on the person) and
means, in a contract, that the personal characteristics of the other party to
the agreement determine the implementation and conclusion of that
contract.' 5 Indeed, the intuitu personae concept is not just a crucial aspect
of French franchising, 6 but also is frequently found in French and other
Civil Law legal discourse on contracts generally.' 7  For our purposes,
1 BASCHET, supra note 4, at 21 (also noting that continuing assistance is an element of
franchising); JEAN-MARIE LELOUP, LA FRANCHISE DROIT ET PRATIQUE 11-12 (4th ed.
2004); GILLES THIRIEZ & JEAN-PIERRE PAMIER, GUIDE PRATIQUE DE LA FRANCHISE 12
(4thed. 2004) (also emphasizing the franchisor's use of a coherent and comprehensive
marketing scheme).
12 See also Delforge & Ortoli, supra note 8, at FR-6-7.
13 See Les Petites Affiches, November 9th, 2006, N°224, page 23, §58.
14 See generally Philippe Le Tourneau, Contrat intuitu personae), J. -Cl. Civ., Fasc.
200 (2002); Louisa Igoudjil, Le regime des contrats d'enterprise 57 n.268 (2006),
available at http://www.iquesta.com/Memoire-These/DocumentDroit/loirce04l006.pdf
(Master's Thesis) (noting the difference between intuitu personae contracts "in
consideration of the person" and contracts in which a party was selected because of his
company's qualities, not his own personal characteristics - the latter being a <contrat
d'intuitufirmae>> (concerning or depending on the firm); also distinguishing l'intuitu
pecunia, in which the capital that a party brought to the contract is more important than
the party itself).
15 See OCED (L 'observatoire consulaire des entreprises en difficults - OCED), (a
business and legal organization created in 1994 in partnership with the commercial
court of Paris to study and advise firms in difficulty),
http://www.oced.ccip.fr/htmlexique.htmhtm#lexl (defining numerous legal terms,
including "intuitu personae") (last visited Mar. 14, 2009).
16 Professor Philippe le Tourneau notes, "the franchise contract is necessarily marked by
a strong intuitu personae." PHILIPPE LE TOURNEAU, LES CONTRATS DE FRANCHISAGE 4
(2nd ed. 2007) (trans. by Robert W. Emerson). Indeed, in its treatise, le Tourneau
devotes much time to intuitu personae. Id. at 4, 56-57, 103-104, 119-120, 158-161,
202, 204-205, 238 & 257-259.
17 Employment contracts and agency arrangements, not just franchises, are types of
contracts that are "intuitu personae." Serge Braudo, Dictionnaire du droitpriv6
frangais, available at http://www.dictionnaire-juridique.com/definition/intuitu-
personae.php (last visited Mar. 14, 2009) (defining the term and with a biography of
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though, this Latin term qualifies the franchise agreement as a personal
arrangement in which the franchisor gives the right to use its brand as well
as know-how, the franchisee brings to the relationship his or her capital,
experience, and competence, and he or she commits to pay royalties as well
as to respect the conditions imposed by the franchisor. As noted French
franchise lawyer Dominique Baschet writes, "[m]ost contract clauses
provide a unilateral intuitus personae in solely the person of the franchisee:
the franchisor signs a franchise agreement depending on the franchisee's
skills and financial capacity.'
18
It is true that the franchise agreement's express language often
flows in one direction, like a river which-in favoring the franchisor-
carries the franchisee downstream toward the franchisor. As such, we can
say that-judging simply by the express contractual language-the French
franchise agreement is unilateral as it only refers to thefranchisor's looking
toward the franchisee's personal characteristics. However, because the
franchisor is experienced and represented by counsel while the franchisee
often acts alone, without legal assistance, 19 most commentators view the
intuitu personae as a mutual dependence, of both franchisor and franchisee.
By this light, as a practical matter, each party agreed to a franchise
relationship because of the personal characteristics of the other party, and
this concept may be referred to as bilateral intuitus personae.20 Moreover,
while the intuitu personae concept may appear alien to the eyes of
American lawyers,2' it is far from unique to French franchise law.22
2. United States
In the United States, a franchise has been defined as a "written
arrangement for a definite or indefinite period, in which a person grants to
another person a license to use a trade name, trademark, service mark, or
related characteristics, and in which there is a community of interest in the
marketing of goods or services at wholesale, retail, by lease, agreement, or
three works-books, articles or theses--devoted to the topic). Also, joint ventures
involve "intuitu personae." Igoudjil, supra note 13, at 57,n.267.
18 <Le plupart des contrats pr~voit une clause dintuitus personae unilatrale en la seule
personne dufranchisk: lefranchiseur signe un contrat defranchise enfonction des
aptitudes professionnelles et des capacitsfinancikres dufranchis6>. BASCHET, supra
note 4, at 430 (trans. by Robert W. Emerson).
'9 Id. at 430; LELOUP, supra note 10, at 268.
20 BASCHET, supra note 4, at 430; LE TOURNEAU, supra note 15, at 4 & 257; LELOUP,
supra note 10, at 268; OLIVIER VAES, FRANCHISING: GUIDE PRATIQUE POUR JURISTES
24-27 (2007) (discussing Belgian franchise law and making the same points of law and
practice about the bilateral nature of intuitu personae).
21 The term is not even found in the most recent edition of Black's Law Dictionary (8t
ed. 2004).
22 Besides Belgian franchise law (VAES, supra note 19, at 24-27), intuitu personae is a
key concept in the franchise law of Italy.22 See Aldo Frignani & Giuseppe Tomasetti,
Italy, in INTERNATIONAL FRANCHISE SALES LAWS, supra note 8, at ITAL-1, ITAL-1 1.
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otherwise. 23 Furthermore, the franchise requires that in consideration of
the use of the license, the franchisee pays a franchise fee.24
Such a business relationship can have particular characteristics
defined by federal or state laws. Whether the parties themselves describe
the relationship as a "franchise" is immaterial. In fact, multiple statutes and
regulations define the franchise relationship differently. Hence, a statute
may define a relationship as a franchise under the law of one state, but
under the law of another state the relationship qualifies, perhaps, as merely
a form of licensing relationship or of distributorship. Bearing that in mind,
we must first determine which law is applicable to the relationship in order
to know whether it is a franchise or not.
At the national level in the United States, the Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC") looks to the three elements that, under its rules,
compose a franchise. In order for a franchise to exist, there must be an
offer of the use of a trademark, the extension of significant control but also
assistance, and a required payment:
(h) Franchise means any continuing commercial
relationship or arrangement, whatever it may be called, in
which the terms of the offer or contract specify, or the
franchise seller promises or represents, orally or in writing,
that:
(1) The franchisee will obtain the right to operate a
business that is identified or associated with the
franchisor's trademark, or to offer, sell, or
distribute goods, services, or commodities that are
identified or associated with the franchisor's
trademark;
(2) The franchisor will exert or has authority to
exert a significant degree of control over the
franchisee's method of operation, or provide
significant assistance in the franchisee's method of
operation; and
(3) As a condition of obtaining or commencing
operation of the franchise, the franchisee makes a
required payment or commits to make a required
payment to the franchisor or its affiliate.25
At the state level, the laws are of two different kinds: (1)
registration laws and (2) relationship laws. Registration laws govern the
initial offer and sale of franchises within the state. Those laws are the most
common because they are the ones encountered first by companies
23 N.J. STAT..ANN. § 56:10-3 (West 2008).
24 Id; WASH. REV. CODE § 19.100.010 (2007).
25 Federal Trade Commission (FTC), 16 C.F.R. § 436. 1(h)(l) to (3) (2008).
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heretofore unfamiliar with franchising. As for relationship laws, they
regulate the post-sale relationship between franchisor and franchisee.
Although these relationship laws provide varying definitions of a franchise,
it is still possible to find among them some common criteria. For example,
the aforesaid franchise elements of (1) compliance to a marketing plan, (2)
association with the trademark, and (3) payment of a fee are the three
elements composing a franchise in twelve states. 26 In five other states, 27 the
licensing of the trademark, the establishment and maintenance of a
community of interest, and the payment of a fee are the three elements
constituting a franchise. Finally, four other states 28 have definitions that
involve some elements from these previous 17 states, whether the 12 states
emphasizing a marketing plan or the five referring to a community of
interest.
B. Laws Applicable to the Franchise Contract in France or the United
States
1. In France, Legislation at the National and European Levels
In France, for a long time, the absence of applicable texts favored
the development of the franchise distribution system. The absence of a
legal framework thus allowed many franchisors to mistreat franchisees.
The French Franchise Federation's creation of the Code of Ethics in 197229
("the Code" or "EFF Code") represented the first move to regulate this type
of business relationship. While the goal of the Code was to make such
practices more ethical, the Code ultimately had little effect on moral
behavior because its enforcement was not mandatory.3 °
The 1972 Code of Ethics eventually became accepted at the
European level under the European Franchise Federation ("EFF").31
Whenever contracting parties refer expressly to this Code, or whenever the
26 California, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, Michigan, North Dakota, Oregon,
Rhode Island, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin.
27 Hawaii, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, and South Dakota.
28 Connecticut, Missouri, New York and New Jersey.
29 Code de D~ontologie Europ~en de la Franchise, available at http://www.franchise-
fff.com/Le-Code-de-deontologie-europeen-de.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2009) (each
national federation or association has since taken part of the Code for its own ethical
standards and thereby has ensured that the Code's promotion, interpretation and
adaption remain useful in that adopting country). The Code represents the will to
provide for good usages; in effect, it may be considered a good manners code for
European franchisors.
30 Dictionnaire Permanent Droit des Affaires 1363 (May 2, 2006).
3 1 European Franchise Federation, European Code of Ethics for Franchising, available
at http://www.eff-franchise.com/codeofethics0.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2009). As
reported by the French Franchise Federation, the Code of Ethics, originating in France
in 1972, became the European Code in 1991, available at http://www.franchise-
fff.comNos-missions.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2009).
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franchisor is a member of one of the franchise national federations within
the EFF, the Code's value is extremely significant. For instance, the Code
compels a franchisor that decided to join the federation, and hence
committed to the Code's requirements, to ensure that its concept is
thoroughly tested, and that it is the rightfhl titleholder of all the signs,
brands, and trade names to be used while operating the franchised business.
While a court may still turn to the EFF Code to inform itself about
possible custom or usage, it is a franchisor's having joined a national
franchise federation that mandates the franchisor's compliance with the
Code. Because adoption of the Code is an essential element of federation
membership, the franchisor's decision to join the federation makes the
Code an implicit part of every franchise agreement the franchisor
32subsequently enters. This Code shows the essential points that must at
least be anticipated in the franchise contract, and it also presents pre-
contractual rules similar to the one ultimately prescribed by French
statutory and regulatory law in the Loi Doubin (now discussed).33
French lawmakers also eventually intervened to resolve difficulties
between franchisors and their franchisees. Article 1 of a December 31,
1989 French statute applies specifically to the franchise contract and other
distribution contracts.34 This law is commonly known as the Loi Doubin
after Francois Doubin, the minister who introduced it.35 The statute seeks
to protect potential franchisees by requiring the disclosure of sufficient pre-
contractual information before the parties commit to an exclusivity
agreement. The application decree of April 4, 1991 of the Loi Doubin
details the information that must be contained in the pre-contractual
document before the final contract between the franchisor and the
32 A franchisor may avoid the Code's dictates simply by choosing not to join the
federation.
33 See Decree 91-337 published in the Official Journal (JO), Apr. 4, 1991, whose
purpose is to apply the 1st Article of the law n°89-1008 of Dec. 31, 1989, (Loi Doubin)
in relation to the commercial and craft businesses' development and the improvement
of their economic, legal and social environment.
34 Law No. 89-1008 of Dec. 31, 1989 Journal Officiel de la Rdpublique Fran~aise [J.O.]
[Official Gazette of France], Jan. 2, 1990. (orelative au developpement des entreprises
commerciales et artisanales et ei l'amlioration de leur environnement 6conomique,
juridique et social. > In English, "concerning the development of commercial and
artisan enterprises and the improvement of their economic, legal and social
environment"). Article I is relevant for franchising. For an English translation see
CCH, Business Franchise Guide, 7135, available at http://www.eff-
franchise.com/france franchise legislation loi oubin english.pdf.
35 Doubin served in the cabinet of Prime Minister Michel Rocard from May 1988 to
Jun. 1991 and of Edith Cresson from June 1991 to April 1992. From 1988 to 1991,
Doubin was Ministre dlgu6 charg6 du Commerce et de 'Artisanat (Minister Delegate
in Charge of Trade and Handicrafts), with Consumer Affairs also added to his portfolio
of functions from May 1991 until Apr. 1992. See
http://www.industrie.gouv.fr/biblioth/docu/rapports/dvchrono.htm (last visited Mar. 14,
2009).
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franchisee is concluded.36 The decree contains three articles, the first of
which specifies the information that must be disclosed. Article 2 provides
that anyone who does not provide the required information as established in
Article 1 of the Loi Doubin is liable to pay the fines meted out for fifth class
offenses, and Article 3 entrusts the decree's execution to the Minister of
Justice, the Minister of Industry and Development, and the Minister
Delegate for Commerce and Handicrafts.37 In accordance with the fourth
paragraph of Article 1 of the Loi Doubin, the disclosure document must be
delivered at least twenty days before the execution of the contract or, if
applicable, before the payment of any sum of money specifically required,
in order to obtain an exclusive territory.38
At the European level, Article 81 § 3 of the Amsterdam Treaty39
prohibits vertical agreements and concerted practices.40 In the famous
Pronuptia case of 1986, 4' the Court of Justice of the European
Communities considered that franchise agreements may violate Section 3 of
Article 85 of the Rome Treaty (1957) that created the European Economic
Community, particularly because of exclusivity supply duties. The concept
of the franchise itself was jeopardized and, with it, a major and burgeoning
sector of European economic activity. The Pronuptia court did not find
that the use of franchising to distribute goods somehow violated, by itself,
Article 85; instead, courts and regulators would need to evaluate, in their
economic context, the actual franchise agreement provisions. So, the court
opined, the ability of the franchisor to make price recommendations (but
not to institute requirements, engage in concerted practices or engage in
price-fixing) is permitted under Article 85.42 Likewise, contract clauses
36 Decree No. 91-337 of Apr. 4, 1991 applying Article 1 of the Law No. 89-1008 of
December 31, 1989, in Journal Officiel de la Rdpublique Frangaise [J.O.] [Official
Gazette of France], April 6, 1991 (a correction to the Decree was published in the
Journal Official of May 4, 1991). For an English translation see CCH, Business
Franchise Guide, 7136, available at http://www.eff-
franchise.com/france franchise legislation loi oubin english.pdf.
31 See infra note 40.38 id.
39 This treaty, signed Feb. 10, 1997, is, for purposes of the Rome Treaty (1957) which
instituted the European Community, a continuation of that earlier treaty's Article 85 on
competition-now renumbered to Article 81.
40 See generally Lise Alm, What Is the Point of European Competition Law? - An
Evaluation of the Achievement of the Single Market Goal through the Use of Article 81
of the EC Treaty (Autumn 2007) (Master's Thesis, University of Lund ), available at
http://www.jur.lu.se/Internet/Biblioteket/Examensarbeten.nsf/0/630B83 B62D3250AOC
125738B00362C32/$File/exam.pdf.
41 Case 161/84, Pronuptia de Paris GmbH v. Pronuptia de Paris Irmgard Schillgallis,
1986 E.C.R. 353.. [CJCE, January 28. 1986. Aff.161/84, Pronuptia de Paris GmbH c/
Pronuptia de Paris Irmgard Schillgalis.].
42 By comparison, the U.S. Supreme Court recently gave even more flexibility to
franchisors or others wishing to engage in resale price maintenance ("RPM"), which
constitutes a vertical restraint of trade. In Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v.
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protecting the franchisor's know-how, assistance, and network
identification and reputation (e.g., trademarks) do not conflict with Article
85 while provisions for sharing markets between a franchisor and its
franchisees or among a system's franchisees do constitute anticompetitive
restrictions for purposes of that Article. It became clear that only the
adoption of an exemption, such as the one now included in the same
Article, could resolve the difficulties in interpretation and implementation,
including a chilling impact on European franchising. Because some
vertical agreements, such as franchise contracts, benefit customers and
society, in December 1999, the European Commission adopted an
exemption regulation protecting the franchise agreements. On October 13,
2000, the Commission then published Guidelines on these vertical restrains.
So, in summary, voluntary ethics principles, French disclosure
rules, and European competition law provide the framework for French
franchisors seeking to comply with franchise legal standards. This legal
scaffolding is so meager that-for more specific issues, besides simply
disclosures or antitrust-even a Civil Law country such as France leaves
parties turning beyond Codes (statutes and administrative guidelines) and to
case law. While French legal theory may almost abhor stare decisis,43 the
day-to-day reality seems quite different. 44 In the absence of non-judicial
PSKS, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 2705 (2007), the Court applied a rule of reason approach to a
supplier's action, presumably intended to manage and exert control over profits, in
which the supplier implicitly or explicitly states that retailers are to sell the supplier's
goods at a minimum price, i.e., no discounts below the minimum price level. (Some
retailers/franchisees may, in fact, seek RPM as a way to fix prices horizontally).
43 A core principle, set out very early in the French Code Civil, is: <4l est defendu aux
juges de prononcer par voie de disposition gdnrale et rkglementaire sur les causes qui
leur sont soumises)). C. civ. 5 ("It is forbidden for judges to issue rules in the form of
general and binding decisions on those cases which are submitted to them" (trans. by
Robert W. Emerson)).
44 See Vincy Fon & Francesco Parisi, Judicial Precedents in Civil Law Systems: A
Dynamic Analysis, 26 INT'L REV. OF LAW & ECON. 519, 519-535 (2006). (Also
published as George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 04-15 and
Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 07-19; available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=534504).
The authors note that even though Civil Law jurisdictions do not adopt the stare decisis
principle for adjudication, prior court decisions may still be persuasive inasmuch as
Civil Law courts are expected to consider those decisions when there is a sufficient
level of consistency in the case law. While no single decision binds a Civil Law
tribunal, these decision makers will respond to a uniform set of decisions. The Civil
Law courts, therefore, treat "precedents" as a source of "soft" law, considering them -
but not feeling themselves bound - when rendering their own decisions. The more
unvarying the past opinions, the greater the persuasive force of that case law; because
disagreeing judges do not file dissenting opinions, the Civil Law cases running counter
to the dominant trend are the signals of dissent among the judiciary and may influence
future holdings. See also PETER NAYLER, BUSINESS LAW IN THE GLOBAL
MARKETPLACE: THE EFFECTS ON INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 31 (2005) (citing Code
Civil Article 5, supra note 42, and noting that there is no French legal axiom supporting
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law (e.g., legislation or administrative promulgation), the French case law
for contracts governs franchise agreements and the parties thereto.45
2. In the United States, Legislation at the State and Federal
Levels
Sometimes franchisor-franchisee relationships have been classified
as securities under federal or state securities laws.4 6 However, numerous
decisions in the 1970s and 1980s held that a franchise did not meet the
definitional threshold.47  While most franchised relationships call for too
the concept that a French judicial determination, even one by the highest court, the
Cour de Cassation, should have any binding effect on other decisions; but refuting this
"theoretical position" with the "practical reality" that French court decisions
(jurisprudence) "are widely cited by lawyers and by textbook writers," that many
higher court holdings appear in law reports and "are accepted as having persuasive
weight, which only increases as the courts progressively settle down to a uniform and
consistent attitude on any particular point," and that "an undeviating line of reasoning-
for example, of the Cour de Cassation-has an authority, judged from a practical point
of view, barely distinguishable from a decision of the House of Lords").
45 All the rules included in the civil code from Article 1101 to 1369 of the Civil Code
46 See Kathy J. Tidd, Is a Franchise Also a Security?, FRANCH. L.J. 1, 1 (Winter 1988);
see also In re: Bestline Prods. Secs. & Antitrust Litigation, 412 F. Supp. 732 (S.D. Fla.
1976) (holding that a combined multilevel and franchise system was a "security"
because it satisfied the four requirements of the venerable decision, SEC v. WJ. Howey
Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946): (1) an investment of money, (2) in a common
enterprise or venture, (3) with a reasonable expectation of profits, and (4) to be derived
from the significant or essential managerial or entrepreneurial efforts of others affecting
the enterprise or venture's success); accord, SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497
F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974); Stanley v. Commercial Courier Serv., Inc., 411 F. Supp. 818,
823 (D. Or. 1975); SEC v. Bull Inv. Group, Inc., No. 74-5806-M, 1975 WL 1271 (D.
Mass. 1975) (holding that arrangement whereby local "dealers" (franchisees) would
solicit new customers in return for a commission was a security because ultimate
success or failure of the recruitment depended upon franchiser's sales-presentation
efforts); Mitzner v. Cardet Int'l Inc., 358 F. Supp. 1262 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (holding that
distributorship franchise was a security where franchisee's role was purely mechanical
and ministerial, devoid of any power to make "meaningful or independent business
decisions"); State v. Consumer Business Sys., 482 P.2d 549, 554 (Ore. App. Ct. 1971)
(finding that a franchise did not meet the Howey standard but fell under the Oregon
state securities statute because of how it involved "risk capital"); Augustine & Hrusoff,
Franchise Regulation, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 1347, 1354-63 (1970) (outlining how, under
California securities law interpretation, a franchise could be considered a security).
47 See, e.g., Meyer v. Dans un Jardin, S.A., 816 F.2d 533 (10th Cir. 1987) (holding that
boutique franchise was not a security); Villeneuve v. Advanced Bus. Concepts Corp.,
730 F.2d 1403 (11 th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (distributorship for sale of self-watering
planters was not a security); Bitter v. Hoby's Int'l, Inc., 498 F.2d 183 (9th Cir. 1974)
(holding that restaurant franchise was not a security since franchisees responsible for
day-to-day management and operation of restaurant, despite strict franchise guidelines);
Nash & Assocs., Inc. v. Lum's of Ohio, Inc., 484 F.2d 392 (6th Cir. 1973); Mr. Steak,
Inc. v. River City Steak, Inc., 460 F.2d 666, 670 (10th Cir. 1972) (holding that
restaurant franchise was not a security); Gotham Print, Inc. v. American Speedy
Printing Centers, Inc., 863 F. Supp. 447 (E.D. Mich. 1994) (holding that master
2009]
328 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 3:2
JOURNAL
much initiative and effort on the franchisee's part to be a security, the
reflexive notion that a franchise cannot be a security is too facile:
Franchising arrangements ... may be securities even if the
franchisees are not totally passive. Instead of insisting on
abject dependence, courts focus on the extent to which the
promoter or a third party is involved in the subsequent
management of the franchised business. Thus, a franchise
is not a security if the franchisee will be largely responsible
for running it, even if the franchiser will help start the
franchised business. On the other hand, franchise programs
may be securities when the franchiser is largely responsible
for selling to the franchisee's potential customers.48
However, the longstanding, ultimate goal of some franchisee
advocates-to have franchising subject to the affirmative duty of disclosure
required under SEC Rule 10(b)(5)49-failed. 50  The push for franchisee
protections met some success in other areas, namely state legislation,
common law interpretation, and via federal disclosure promulgations. In
October 1979, the Federal Trade Commission established a rule entitled,
"Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning Franchising and
Business Opportunity Ventures. 51
The FTC rule applies to all "continuing commercial relationships";
that is, so to speak, an alliance in which "the parties reasonably anticipated
at the time of entering into it that it would.., involve an ongoing course of
dealing over a period of time. 52 The FTC rules preempt state and local
laws to the extent that those laws conflict with the federal statute.53 But
consistent state laws are not preempted, and the FTC further allows state
franchise for printing stores was not a security); L.H.M., Inc. v. Lewis, 371 F. Supp.
395 (D.N.J. 1974) (holding that theater franchise was not a security due to participants'
"significant contributions" to the management and operation of the theater), affd, 510
F.2d 970 (3d Cir. 1975); Fox v. Ehrmantraut, 28 Cal.3d 127, 139, 615 P.2d 1383, 167
Cal. Rptr. 595 (1980) (California Supreme Court decision that the sale of a franchise
involving the franchisee's active participation in the franchise on the franchisee's part
was not a security); Mark H. Miller, Franchising in Texas, 14 ST. MARY'S L.J. 301, 303
n.5 (1983) (commenting on efforts to regulate franchising by defining it as a "security"'
but citing several case holdings for its conclusion that this approach "floundered" and
was "currently out of favor").
48 Harvey Bines & Steve Thel, Investment Management Arrangements and the Federal
Securities Laws, OHIO ST. L.J. 459,482 (1997) (footnotes omitted).
49 17 C.F.R. § 240.10(b)(5) (2008).
50 HAROLD BROWN ET AL., FRANCHISING: REALITIES AND REMEDIES § 6.06[1 ], n. 1 (2008
ed.) (citing cases, legislation, and commentary from 1967 to 1983).
" 16 C.F.R § 436 (2007) (this is the FTC rule that was amended in March 2007).
52 See Sells Enterprise, Inc., FTC Informal Staff Advisory Opinion, 2 Bus. Franchise
Guide (CCH) 6423, Aug. 28, 1980.
53 Illinois Corp. Travel, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., 889 F.2d 751 (7th Cir. 1989).
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laws inconsistent with the federal statute if they provide prospective
purchasers equal or greater protection than that imposed by the FTC.54
Certainly, many states reacted faster than did the FTC. This started
with California, which in 1970 enacted the first state law designed to
regulate franchising generally rather than merely one industry such as
automobile sales, farm equipment contracts, or alcoholic beverages.
55
Within the next decade, many other states followed with one or more
franchise registration, disclosure, or relationship statues (including
Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey,
New York, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Virginia,
Washington, and Wisconsin).56
These various state laws govern the offer and sale of franchises.57
But because it worried about uniformity, the Midwest Securities
Commissioners association (now the North American Securities
Administrators Associations, or "NASAA") adopted on September 2, 1975
the Uniform Franchise Offering Circular Guidelines ("UFOC"). Via a 2007
amendment to the Federal Trade Commission rule on franchising, the
Franchise Disclosure Document ("FDD") replaced the UFOC. 58  Most
UFOC provisions are found, perhaps in some altered state, in the new
FDD.5 9
The aforementioned dual level of legislation (federal and state)
makes the United States legal field appear more complicated than that of
France. This structure does not make the case law any easier to understand,
and this is troubling for the franchisees that are often not sure about the
legal status of their business relationships, and, more particularly, about
their rights and responsibilities.
14 Tousley v. North Am. Van Lines, Inc, 752 F.2d 96, 100-103 (4th Cir. 1985); Morgan
v. Air Brok Limousine, Inc., 510 A2d 1197, 1205-1207 (N.J Super. Ct. Law Div. 1986).
55 W. MICHAEL GARNER, FRANCHISE AND DISTRIBUTION LAW AND PRACTICE § 1: 10
(2008); Sells Enterprise, Inc., FTC Informal Staff Advisory Opinion, 2 Bus. Franchise
Guide (CCH) 6423, Aug. 28, 1980.
56 BROWN, supra note 49, § 6.03[1], § 6.03[1] n.1, § 6.03[3] & § 6.03[3] n.7; GARNER,
supra note 54, § 1: 10.
57 Besides Iowa (which enacted a "pro-franchisee" relationship law in 1992, later
reduced in scope in 2000) and Rhode Island (which in 2007 enacted a franchise
relationship statute modeled after Wisconsin's Fair Dealership Law), there have been
no new state enactments and very little amending of any note. Therefore, tables from
1990 categorizing all of the states in terms of their legislative approach, vel non,
towards franchising are otherwise still essentially accurate. See Robert W. Emerson,
Franchising and the Collective Rights of Franchisees, 43 VAND. L. REv. 1503, 1567
(1990).
58 See 16 C.F.R. § 436 (2008); Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning
Franchising and Business Opportunities, 72 Fed. Reg. 15,444 (March 30, 2007) (to be
codified at 16 C.F.R. pts. 436 and 437)..
59 See Gerald C. Wells & Dennis E. Wieczorek, A Road Map to the New FTC
Franchise Rule, 26 FRANCHISE L.J. 105 (2007).
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C. Different Types of Franchise Systems in France and in the United
States
The reasons to choose the franchise system are the same in France
and the United States. For the franchisor, using the franchise system is a
way to expand its capital through the entry rights, fees, and royalties it
receives from its franchisees. For the franchisee, using the franchise system
cannot ensure, but certainly may promote, success through the use of a
tested business plan. That lessens risks, while still allowing the franchise
owned a certain level of independence. The franchisee also profits from
training and educational programs, usually furnished directly from the
franchisor. The franchisor takes care of advertising, with symbols and
trademarks still ubiquitous. Consequently, the customers will recognize the
products or services more easily.
There are different types of franchise systems in France and in the
United States. However, it is fair to say that they end up overlapping each
other. Indeed, as explained infra, three types of franchise are recognized in
France, and all three are compatible with the two types of franchise that
exist in the United States.
1. French Franchise Categories
In France, the Cour de Justice des Communaut~s Europdennes
recognizes three types of franchise systems: (1) the distribution franchise,
(2) the service franchise, and (3) the production franchise.6 °
Type 1: The Distribution Franchise
The object of the distribution franchise is to distribute the products
made, or ordered to be made, for the franchisor, and to then sell them
through its franchising network. This is done under a single trade name that
identifies the network and warranties the same "savoir-faire," or know-how.
Distribution franchise systems are most commonly used in the furniture,6'
textile,62 and "do it yourself' areas.63
60 Dictionnaire Permanent Droit des Affaires, p. 1364, May 2, 2006.
61 See, Cuisinella, created in 1959, franchised in 1990, classified as a franchise of
distribution, in the furniture area (Kitchen furniture distribution), available at
http://www.observatoiredelafranchise. fr/creation-entreprise/franchise-cuisinella-
378.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2009).62 See, Mango, created in 1984, franchised in 1992, in the textile area (Designed clothes
distribution), available at http://www.observatoiredelafranchise.fr/creation-
entreprise/franchise-mango- 1429.htm (last visited March 14, 2009).63 See, M. Bricolage, created in 1965, franchised in 1980, in the "do it yourself' area,
available at http://www.observatoiredelafranchise.fr/creation-entreprise/franchise-mr-
bricolage-590.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2009).
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Type 2: The Service Franchise
The service franchise system offers a service under the franchisor's
trade name, brand name, or brand itself that is then carried out according to
the instructions of the franchisor.
In this type of franchise network the know-how is of even greater
importance, and thus implies a strong collaboration between the parties.
The advertisement investments here are substantial. This type of franchise
system is normally used in economic sectors such as catering, 64 car or truck
rental, 65 transportation of goods, cleaning and dying,66 temporary work, and
wedding planning.
Type 3: The Production Franchise
The production franchise system, also known as the industrial
franchise, happens when the franchisee makes the products himself, but
according to the franchisor's instructions. These products are then sold, in
consideration for a royalty, under the franchisor's brand.67  More
64 See, Haagen-Dazs, created in 1990, franchised in 1991, classified as a franchise of
service (ice cream parlor and fast food), available at
http://www.observatoiredelafranchise.fr/creation-entreprise/franchise-haagen-dazs-
shops-1599.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2009); Pizza Hut, created in 1958, franchised in
1989 ( pizza fast food), available at http://www.observatoiredelafranchise.fr/creation-
entreprise/franchise-pizza-hut-174.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2009); McDonald's,
created and franchised in 1955 ( hamburger fast food), available at
http://www.observatoiredelafranchise.fr/creation-entreprise/franchise-mc-donald-s-
444.htm. (last visited Mar. 14, 2009)
65 See, "Rent a car," created in 1996, franchised in 1997 (Car rental service), available
at http://www.observatoiredelafranchise. fr/creation-entreprise/franchise-rent-a-car-
127.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2009).
66 See, 5 d Sec, created and franchised in 1968 (Service to the Individual, clothes
cleaning and ironing), available at http://www.observatoiredelafranchise.fr/creation-
entreprise/franchise-5asec-285.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2009).
67 For example, in France a fast-growing alternative to the traditional franchise, in
certain industries such as retail clothing sales, is the commission-affiliation. See, Laure
Guiserix, "Commission-affiliation: risques partagds," Franchise-Magazine.com, Aug.
25, 2008, available at http://www.franchise-
magazine.com/actualite/conseils/commission-affiliation-risques-partages-43.html (last
visited Mar. 14, 2009) ("Commission-Affiliation: risk-sharing") (describing a system
that has grown from 30% of clothing store operations in 2005 to 46%three years later,
and that continues to grow; while losing some control over its operations, a
commission-affiliate is freed from having to purchase its inventory prior to selling that
inventory; for clothing stores, with much stock and much quick change in stock due to
seasonal changes, the arrangement frees the affiliate of a monetary outlay of between
20,000 and 150,000 euros); Anne-Laure Allain, "Chattawak : l'affiliation sans
contrefaqon," Franchise-Magazine.com, March 12, 2008, available at
http://www. franchise-magazine.com/actualite/breves/chattawak-s-affiche-dans-la-
capitale-3880.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2009). In the commission-affiliation, the
"franchisor" retains ownership of the stock (e.g., clothing) in the franchisee's store.
The contract for a commissionaire-affiliation contains elements characteristic of both a
commission-based relationship, as the sales are made in the commissioner's name on
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frequently, however, the franchisee resells the products to the franchisor
who then distributes them to the public.
68
2. "Contributing Commercial Relationships" Recognized by the
U.S. Federal Trade Commission
The FTC recognizes two forms of "continuing commercial
relationships": (1) franchises, and (2) business opportunity ventures.
Franchises may be considered of two different types: package (business
format) franchises and product franchises.
In package franchises, the franchisor licenses a franchisee to
operate a pre-packaged business format that is identified by the franchisor's
trademark. In France, this type of system would be classified as a service
the principal's behalf, and of an affiliation, as each distributor is a member of the
network organized by the principal (in that way, like a franchisee part of a franchised
network). The distributor has, inter alia, these characteristics: independent ownership
of its business; an exclusive right to procure supplies under the supplier's trade name,
using the supplier's corporate name as a shop sign (displayed at the sales outlet to the
exclusion of any other sign) and in all relations with other suppliers (e.g. in its checks
or charges) and with customers (e.g., cash register receipts); a duty to sell only to
consumers; a consignment of products to which the supplier retains title; and
compensation by commission on turnover (sales) of the stock (the inventory). By not
having to pay in advance for its stock, the commission-affiliate frees up funding and
lessens its need for financing, but-in return-he loses some control over his business,
with choice of the stock and its price greatly curtailed if not eliminated. To avoid price-
fixing by the principal, the commission-affiliate may for some merchandise alter
(really, lower) the price established by the principal, but that difference in price comes
totally out of the commission-affiliate's ultimate "take" (commission) on sales.
Interview with Alex Raymond, counsel for the Fdration Frangaise de la Franchise
(June 13, 2008). In a Cour de Cassation ruling that overturned a widely reported Court
of Appeal holding from September 2006 (Cour d'Appel Paris, 5e civ. A, Sept. 13,
2006), the French high court in effect established that franchisors can create and
maintain commission-affiliations without fear that later, upon any cessation of the
relationship, the franchisee will successfully contend that it was a mere exclusive agent
(not really an independent franchisee), and thus entitled to a large severance allowance
(in the case of Chattawak, that was two years of lost commissions-at least 145,000
euros-according to the Paris Court of Appeals holding). Cass. com., Feb. 26, 2008,
Arret No. 289 F-D (S.A.S. Chattawak v. Socitj Chantal Pieri). The key thing to
maintaining the affiliate's independence and franchise status is to ensure that the
contract explicitly stipulates such independence and that the franchisee be permitted to
place its own name on signs and otherwise indicate to customers its own independent
status, not entirely invisible behind the name of the franchisor-supplier. Gilles Menguy,
La commission affiliation, FRANCHISELAND.COM, available at http://www.franchise-
land.com/la-bible-de-la-franchise/les-autres-formes-de-commerces-independants-
organises/la-commission-affiliation- 16.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2009).
68 For example, Coca-Cola, created in 1889, is an industrial franchisor. The franchisees
are Coca Cola producers, http://www.thecoca-
colacompany.com/ourcompany/index.html
Yoplait, created in 1965, franchised in 1965, available at
http://www.yoplait.fr/page.php/en/49 174.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2009).
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franchise.69 Package franchises include, for example, motel chains and tax
preparation services.
In product franchises, the franchisee is licensed to distribute goods
manufactured by the franchisor and bearing the franchisor's trademark.
Automobile and gasoline distributorships are classic examples of this type
of franchising arrangement.7 ° In France, product franchises would be
considered distribution franchises.
As for American business opportunity ventures, they are not
considered franchises. These undertakings represent a simpler relationship,
a business scheme used typically for vending machine routes and
businesses involving the assembly of parts in the home. Hence, the United
States divides franchising into two classifications (package franchises - also
known as business format franchises - and product distribution franchises),
whereas France breaks down franchising into three categories (distribution,
service, and production franchises).
D. Disclosure Information in France Contrasted with the United
States
In both France and the United States, to create a franchise
relationship, certain information must first be disclosed. As a skeleton is to
a body, this preliminary, decidedly regulated step of the franchise
relationship is the most important part of entering into a franchise
agreement. From there, the parties are free to add the musculature to the
franchise arrangement (the skeleton)-that is, to exercise freedom of
contract and build a customized contract.
1. In France, Disclosures Required by the Loi Doubin and the
Decree Applying that Law
The Decree of April 4, 1991,71 implemented in the commerce code
under Article L 330-3, provides that twenty days before the signature of the
contract, the franchisor must give the franchisee certain information
documents and a contract project. This information includes the contacts of
the franchisor's headquarters, the nature of the activity, the amount of
69 LE TOURNEAU, supra note 15, at 23-31 (on ofranchisage de service>>).
70 Such specific industries, not franchising generally, are the only ones subject to federal
statutes. See, e.g., Automobile Dealers Franchise Association, 15 U.S.C. § 1221-1225
(2008) (enacted in 1956 and popularly termed the "Dealer's Day in Court Act");
Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2801-2806, 2821-2824, 2841 (2008)
(enacted in 1978).7 Decree 91-337 of April 4, 1991, Journal Officiel de la Republique Frangaise [JO],
whose purpose is to apply the Is Article of the law n°89-1008 of Dec. 31, 1989, (Loi
Doubin) in relation to the commercial and craft businesses' development and the
improvement of their economic, legal and social environment.
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capital, the record number to the commercial and corporations' registry, the
bank's contacts, and the history of the company.72
Failure to tender all the information in a timely manner may result
in both civil and criminal sanctions. As a criminal sanction, a 1500 euros
fine will be levied on the franchisor who fails to comply with these
disclosure requirements.73 In addition, franchisees can also seek civil
damages for harm caused by the franchisor's failure to surrender the
documents, for harm caused by inaccuracies in the information, and for
harm resulting from early or abusive termination.74
Furthermore, in the case of mistake or misrepresentation, Article
1109 of the French Civil Code alternatively gives the franchisee the option
of voiding the contract. 75  This dual civil remedy became clear on
December 2000, when a franchisee appealed a decision rejecting his claim
to declare the franchise contract void due to the franchisor's failure to
comply with the pre-contractual disclosures requirement. The Cour de
Cassation76 determined that such failure does void the contract, but only in
cases where consent was procured through mistake, misrepresentation, or
duress.
77
2. In the United States, a Disclosure Required by Federal and
State Laws
The information required in France is very similar to that provided
under both U.S. federal and state laws.
To protect prospective franchise purchasers, the Code of Federal
Regulations (Title 16 C.F.R. §436) requires disclosure of essential and
reliable information. 78  While the federal disclosure regime does not
mandate registration, some state disclosure laws do dictate that franchisors
72 Further elaborating, the franchisor must state the system's date of creation, recall
every major step of the business and presentation of the network, and thus include a list
of each company, with its address, that was related to the system (presumably, had a
franchise contract) but who ceased to be part of the network in the preceding year. For
each such former franchisee, the franchisor is to specify the conditions under which the
franchise was terminated, indicate the length of any proposed contract or renewal
conditions, as well as any transfer conditions and field of exclusivity. Id.
73 Id. at n.41.
74 Id.
75 CODE CIVIL [C. civ] art. 1109 (Fr.): (< II n'y a point de consentement valable si le
consentement n'a 6M donn6 que par erreur ou s'il a 6t extorqu6 par violence ou surpris
par dol.) ("There is no valid consent if the consent was given by mistake or if it was
taken by duress or misrepresentation").
76 Cass. com, Dec. 5, 2000, pourvoi n'97-21.631.
77 See also Cour d'Appel de Lyon (CA Lyon) January 24, 2008,pourvoi n'06/07033,
deciding the franchise contract was void due to misrepresentation by the franchisor, in
failing to inform the franchisee about the condition of the franchise in the
precontractual documents.16 C.F.R. § 436 (2008). See
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2007/0 1/R511003 FranchiseRuleFRNotice.pdf
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register a detailed offering circular before soliciting prospective
franchisees. As stated supra, under the UFOC, effectively replaced in
March 2007 by the FDD, the franchisor typically must still submit an
application and file a fee with the appropriate state authorities. The FTC
Rule, until the 2007 amendment, contained just twenty itemized
requirements.79 Some state authorities had to approve all of the information
and material before the offer of any franchise. Now, with the amended
FTC Rule, the FTC requires franchisors to disclose twenty-three items,
before a potential franchisee might commit to a franchise agreement.
80
Franchisors must deliver the FDD fourteen calendar days before the
franchisee signs any franchise or other binding agreement with, or pays any
consideration to, the franchisor or any affiliate, or earlier upon a prospect's
reasonable request. 81 Franchisors must deliver execution-ready copies of
the franchise agreement seven calendar days before it is executed, with this
waiting period applying only if the franchisor unilaterally (i.e., not in
response to franchisee-initiated negotiations) makes material changes to the
terms of the basic franchise agreement attached to the FDD. 2
The remaining thirty-five states simply have followed the FTC,
and therefore need not register at the state level. What distinguishes these
state laws from corresponding French laws is that the FTC provides three
possibilities of disclosure whereas in France there is no choice. Indeed,
first the American franchisor can choose to make a complete and accurate
disclosure to all potential buyers. This should reduce the potential for sales
abuse by fraudulent franchisors. The second possibility is to not make any
disclosure-ignore the FTC Rule. But, in that case, the franchisor would be
strictly liable for any violation of the FTC Rule; making him subject to civil
penalties of up to $11,000 per violation, as well as a permanent injunction
79 Standard Registration Documents, including among others, information about the
franchisor, its predecessors and Affiliates, the business experience ,the litigation and
bankruptcy history, the initial franchise fee and other fees, the initial investment, the
restrictions on sources of products and services, the franchisee's obligations, the
financing , the franchisor's obligations, the territory, the trademarks, the patents,
copyrights and proprietary information
80 The FTC's Franchising Rule, as amended in 2007, requires disclosures about these 23
items: (1) The Franchisor and any Parents, Predecessors, and Affiliates, (2) Business
Experience, (3) Litigation, (4) Bankruptcy, (5) Initial Fees, (6) Other Fees, (7)
Estimated Initial Investment, (8) Restrictions on Sources of Products and Services, (9)
Franchisee's Obligations, (10) Financing, (11) Franchisor's Assistance, Advertising,
Computer Systems, and Training, (12) Territory, (13) Trademarks, (14) Patents,
Copyrights, and Proprietary Information, (15) Obligation to Participate in the Actual
Operation of the Franchise Business, (16) Restrictions on What the Franchisee May
Sell, (17) Renewal, Termination, Transfer, and Dispute Resolution, (18) Public Figures,
(19) Financial Performance Representations, (20) Outlets and Franchisee Information,
(21) Financial Statements, (22) Contracts, and (23) Receipts. 16 C.F.R. § 436.5 (2008).8 16 C,F,R.§ 436.2(a) (2008).
82 16 C.F.R.§ 436.2(b) (2008).
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against future violations.83 Note that here, the mere noncompliance is
sufficient to prevail in an enforcement action. Third, the franchisor can
comply with the FTC Rule, but omit certain required information. This
omission would, however, significantly ease the burden of proof in both
private actions for misrepresentations, as well as FTC enforcement actions.
Indeed, the showing that the franchisor did not fully comply with the
required disclosure elements could be evidenced by the fact that there is
either no record of such a disclosure, or that existing records are of just a
partial disclosure.
III. FRENCH TRENDS IN LIGHT OF THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE
As instruments drafted by franchisors, both French and American
franchise contracts try to control the spread of franchisee rights or
franchisor obligations beyond what the law-statutory, regulatory, or
adjudicator-already dictates. Three types of franchise exclusivities exist:
(1) supply exclusivity, where the franchisee is the only one to be supplied
by the franchisor in a delineated territory; (2) trade name exclusivity, by
which the franchisor agrees not to establish another retail outlet in the
granted area; and (3) brand exclusivity, 84 that guarantees to the franchisee
the sole right to use the franchisor's distinctive signs within the delineated
territory. The longstanding franchising contretemps of encroachment can
involve all three types, although most cases-particularly those fixed on
non-Intemet issues-center on trade name exclusivity, with brand issues
second and with supply topics a distant third. Often advocates and judges
spend little, if any, time distinguishing these types of rights, as
encroachment simply covers a gamut of sins the franchisor purportedly
committed. This article thus focuses, as do courts and commentators, on
trade name exclusivity.
A. A Contractual Decline in Usage of Territorial Exclusivity Clauses
In French franchising, the presence of a territorial exclusivity
clause used to be paramount, and often is still very important, in the eyes of
the franchisees. Such protections have diminished, however, as France has
started to abandon what once might have been seen as a franchising
sacrament. This decline mirrors the United States' trend from twenty years
83 15 U.S.C. § 45(l) (2008).
' See Cour d'Appel de Paris (C.A), Apr. 5, 2006, Juris-Data n°298242, deciding that
the franchisor's contractual failure can result as much as from the "active" infringement
of the trade mark exclusivity clause, as from its "passive" infringement coming from
the franchisor's incapacity to protect the exclusivity granted to the franchisee.
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ago, where the franchising parties' private law choices (their agreements)
increasingly omitted territorial exclusivity provisions.85
The waning use of exclusivity clauses comports with French law.
As goes French practice, so goes its law, at least for franchise contracts.
That is plain to see when exclusivity is, at least in theory, not an essential
point in the franchise contract. Indeed, without such a clause, a franchise
contract remains valid in France. As maturing franchise systems no longer
need to entice franchisees with exclusive territories, 86 some French franchise
experts contend that exclusive territory clauses have gone from being almost
universal to being an increasingly infrequent contract provision. Still, it has
85 Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Contract Clauses and the Franchisor 's Duty of Care
Toward Its Franchisees, 72 N.C.L. REv. 905, 968 (1994) (two surveys of franchise
agreements, one in 1971 and the other 22 years later, show that the number of contracts
granting exclusive territories for franchisees went from 60% in 1971 to only 46% in
1993); but see IFA EDUC. FOUNDATION, INC., THE PROFILE OF FRANCHISING, VOLUME I:
A STATISTICAL PROFILE OF THE UNIFORM FRANCHISE OFFERING CIRCULAR (UFOC)
DATA 72-73 & 107 (1998) (examining UFOC statements for 1,156 franchise systems
filed during 1996 and finding that 73% of them grant some form of exclusive territory,
as described geographically, in miles, by population, or by number of vehicles; for the
fields specifically studied in the surveys referenced in Emerson, Franchise Contract
Clauses, supra note 84-restaurants and fast-food outlets-almost 300 UFOC
statements (99 for restaurants and 197 for fast-food establishments) reflected grants of
exclusivity at a much higher rate (80% for restaurants, and 69% for fast-food units) than
found in the two earlier surveys). See Roger D. BLAIR & FRANCINE LAFONTAINE, THE
ECONOMICS OF FRANCHISING 223 (2005). While the number of exclusive territories has
risen, according to the author's study of 100 fast-food, restaurant, and ice cream parlor
franchise agreements dated from August 2005 to April 2007 (finding that 60% granted
exclusive territory to the franchisee), the numbers expressly without exclusive territory has
also risen - to 32% (data on file with author). Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Phrasing:
Strong Words, But Weak Faith (August 10, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
86 In France, for example, more established American franchisors, such as McDonald's,
Midas, Quick, and Century 2 1, refuse to grant exclusivity, as they have the name
recognition and market power to acquire the interest and investment of prospective
franchisees without such contractual impediments to system expansion. Laure
Guiserix, Clauses d'exclusivitg, A observer de pros (Exclusivity clauses to watch
closely), FRANCHISE MAGAZINE, Oct./Nov. 2007 (No. 202); accord, THIRIEZ ET PAMIER,
supra note 10, at 197.
87 The movement away from territorial exclusivity may be found in all French
franchising, not just the larger, more established systems, according to Maitre Jean-
Marie Leloup. LELOUP, supra note 10, at 48. But many others disagree. THIRIIEZ ET
PAMIER, supra note 10, at 196-97 (stating that a territorial exclusivity clause is
widespread - 90% of the cases - and then opining that the existence of such a clause is
considered to be a fundamental element of the franchise, with its absence underlining
for many observers a danger (<son absence soulignde par des nombreux observateurs
comme un danger)--then commenting that this danger can be seen in certain hotel
chains with unhappy consequences for the franchisee without the protection of
exclusivity--"when your shop is instructed to stay open until two in the morning
without your consent, then you'll decide you're unhappy!") (trans. by Robert W.
Emerson); Guiserix, supra note 85 (contending that exclusivity clauses are "still
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been observed that most of the franchisees require some type of
exclusivity. 88 According to Professor Didier Ferrier, a noted expert on
French distribution law, including franchise contracts, "'territory
exclusivity' in the franchise contract must be understood as an element of
the skill/know-how (savoir-faire), that is to say, as the territorial basis of
the franchisor's initial success in his distribution model, and hence of each
franchisee's success.,
8 9
We can temper this assertion by looking at trends. While it stays
true at the early points in the network development process, once that
network is well established and prosperous, the supposed charms of
exclusivity may lose their luster. It may then be the case that the franchise
system, in order to stay successful, at that stage needs to expand and even,
in the eyes of some franchisees, perhaps to encroach on individual units'
markets. 90
However, some authors observe a shift to a total abandonment of
territory exclusivity in the last few years. This seems to contradict other
analyses on such clauses. Indeed, in practice-oriented articles the territory
exclusivity clause has masqueraded itself as an unavoidable usage of the
franchise. In fact, "about two thirds of the trade names choose it,"
according to Jean-Baptiste Gouache, a lawyer who specializes in counseling
commercial networks, particularly franchised systems. 9
This movement would find its roots in the expansion of competition
law and economic pressures. Because competition law forbids absolute
provided in the majority of networks" and that, although "no legal text requires the
territory exclusivity clause, it is still considered as a constitutive element of the contract
by [organized franchisees and distributors], with it "in practice ...viewed as an
unavoidable usage in the franchise system" (trans. by Robert W. Emerson).
88 Guiserix, supra note 85.
89 Interview with Didier Ferrier, professor of law, Universitd de Montpellier,
Montpellier, France (June 15, 2008) ; see also LELOUP, supra note 10, at 68-69 (trans.
by Robert W. Emerson) (quoting from Prof. Ferrier - <(( 'exclusivitg territoriale dans la
franchise doit tre conque...comme un 9lment du savoir-faire, c'est-6-dire comme
l'assiette territoriale de la r~ussite initiale dufranchiseur dans son point de distribution
modle, et par la suite de la rdussite de chaquefranchis& ). Many authors were
divided on the point whether the exclusivity is essential to the franchise contract, and
Didier Ferrier is seen as the one who has the most elaborated position. On the necessity
of exclusivity, see Aldo Frigani, "Nuove Reflessioni in Tema di franchising",
GIURISPRUDENZA ITALIANA, 1980 disp.8a 9a, parte IV; Against the necessity: Th.
Bourgoignie, Journal des Tribunaux, Bruxelles 12 jan.1974 ; J. Azdma, Le droit
frangais de la concurrence, op.cit, n°350.
90 See Cass. com, Jan. 14, 2003, in which a franchisor was found to have not infringed
upon the franchisee's territorial exclusivity when it sold products in a territory the
franchise agreement had conceded to the franchisee.
91 Guiserix, supra note 85 (trans. by Robert W. Emerson). Gouache concedes there
may be some decline, generally and within particular systems as they mature. But he
does not see this as particularly noteworthy. Interview with Jean-Baptiste Gouache,
avocat, Paris, France (June 13, 2008).
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territory exclusivity, 92 this concept becomes less attractive. Instead, market
share will be the criteria to determine whether exclusivity is permitted. The
exemption regulation allows it up to 30% of market share of the relevant
market in question, 93 and thus network growth and territorial issues can
remain factually complicated and legally muddled.
In a nutshell, we can say that French franchising activities appear to
be following in the steps of American franchise practices, even if French
jurisprudence has yet to show all the signs of that "pursuit. 9 4  That is
because in the United States, much more so than France, the priority is
network expansion. 95  In America, territory clauses are not nearly as
prevalent. Still, they may be crucial for the protection of some franchisees'
own businesses. So, in order to bolster and maintain the franchise system,
the parties may come to agree on a limited territorial right for franchisees;
this common ground is a compromise - some protection for franchisees,
some remaining liberty to expand for the franchisor. Invoking their
common interests in expansion and protection, the franchise parties and the
courts may, in effect, use for territorial development and protection issues
the "good cause" or good faith and fair dealing standard developed in
termination cases such as Dayan v. McDonald's Corp.
96
B. Court Decisions on Territorial Encroachment Issues
In France, courts recently have answered, negatively, the question
whether de facto territorial exclusivity is recognized in French law. Cases
continue, however, as the jurisprudence, at least in sheer volume, has yet to
evince the decline in exclusivity that may be found in practice. Perhaps this
is to be expected, as actual usage of territorial clauses weakens but many
franchisees still have certain cultural, if not legal, expectations of territorial
protection. 97 Nevertheless, as long as the contract fails to stipulate territory
exclusivity, even if in practice the franchisee may have received some sort
92 INTERNATIONAL FRANCHISING LAW, Vol. 1, at 33-France (Dennis Campbell ed.,
2005) ( "However, clauses stipulating that a franchisee is prohibited from selling to
clients outside its area are void both under French law and Community law, since this
would result in a division in the market").
93 Id.
94 See Les Petites Affiches, La Loi, Le Quotidien Juridique, Nov. 9, 2006, N'224,
studying the recent Court cases, does not reveal already the trend that the use of the
exclusivity clause is declining.
95 For many, if not most, franchisors, rapid territorial development is the essence of a
franchise.
96 Dayan v. McDonald's Corp., 466 N.E.2d 958, 994 (Ill. App.Ct. 1984) (found good
cause for termination because franchisee failed to maintain quality, service, and
cleanliness standards).
9' Franchisee advocates remain adamant that franchisees ordinarily expect, and have the
right to expect, market protections from the possible predations of their own franchisor.
Interview with Serge Meresse, avocat, Paris, France (June 17, 2008).
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of protection, then merely implied terms will not be enforceable. 98 In Cass.
Com., 19 novembre 2002, the franchisee complained that the franchisor had
infringed his "de facto" territorial exclusivity. The lower court found for
the franchisee, but the Cour de Cassation reversed on the basis of Civil
Code Article 1134.99 The contract simply had not provided any express
territorial exclusivity.
The November 19, 2002 decision may be juxtaposed with the views
American courts have offered in similar situations. In Scheck v. Burger
King Corp.,100 the franchisee claimed that the franchisor had breached an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by opening another
franchised restaurant just two miles away from the franchisee's location.
Agreeing with the franchisee, the Court said that even though the franchise
contract explicitly denied the franchisee any territorial rights, the franchisor
had to take into account the effect that opening additional franchises would
have on a nearby franchisee. Although most cases have rejected the
reasoning in Scheck, °1 a number of decisions have furthered Scheck's anti-
encroachment principles. For example, in Burger King Corp. v. Weaver, 1
02
the Court held that Burger King's "longstanding policy against encroachment
and cannibalization" forced the conclusion that neither of the franchise
agreements granted Burger King the absolute right to establish new franchises
at any location, therefore allowing the franchisee to bring his claim under the
implied covenant of good faith.10 3 Likewise, in Vylene v. Naugles, 104 the
franchisee of a Mexican food restaurant chain complained about the
franchisor's establishment of a new unit 1.4 miles away. Following the
Scheck reasoning, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded
that this new establishment was a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. One year later, another circuit court, the Eleventh Circuit, also
followed Scheck's interpretation in Camp Creek Hospitality Inns, Inc. v.
Sheraton Franchise Corp. 105 Examining encroachment case law, the Court
noted, "the great weight of authority" maintains that (1) the implied
covenant will not override express terms in a written franchise agreement,
and (2) citing Scheck, "when there is no such language the franchisor may
not capitalize upon the franchisee's business in bad faith."1,0 6
98 Cass. com., Nov. 19, 2002, pourvoi n' 01-13.492.
99 Code civil [C. civ.] art. 1134 (Fr.) (2008). More is discussed infra.
'
00 See Scheck v. Burger King Corp., 798 F. Supp. 692, 697 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
101 See Fickling v. Burger King Corp., 843 F.2d 1386 (4th Cir. 1988).
102 See Burger King Corp. v. Weaver, 798 F. Supp. 684, (S.D. Fla. 1992).
103 Id. at 689-90.
104 Vylene v. Naugles, 90 F.3d 1472, 1477 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting, "The bad faith
character of the move becomes clear when one considers that building the competing
restaurant had the potential to not only hurt [franchisee] Vylene, but also to reduce
[franchisor] Naugles' royalties from Vylene's operations").
105 Camp Creek Hospitality Inns, Inc. v. Sheraton Franchise Corp., 139 F.3d 1396 (11 th
Cir. 1997).
"Id. at 1403.
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In contrast to the controversial Scheck holding,10 7 the Cour de
Cassation's November 19, 2002 holding may at first glance seem to
demonstrate a certain carelessness, if not cluelessness, about good faith and
fair dealing values. However, if we look closely at the Article on which the
Cour de Cassation based its decision, evidently there was no misconception
at all. Indeed, Article 1134 of the Civil Code, alinea 1 and 3, says:
"Agreements lawfully entered into take the place of the law for those who
have made them. They must be performed in good faith."'
0 8
Therefore, the Cour de Cassation overturned the lower court's
broad interpretation of franchisee territorial protection and decided that
good faith performance was not impaired because the agreement failed to
address the issue of territorial exclusivity.
In the end, we can say that the overall trend in France today is to
take into account only what is written in the contract, as the French courts
strictly interpret the contract. In the United States, it is still unclear when
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing may prevail over what is
expressly written in the contract.
C. Transfer of Franchise Contracts in France
1. The Main Provisions
As no rules of the French Civil Code specifically apply to the
franchise contract, the franchise agreement falls under the category of
unnamed contracts, or "contrats innom~s.' ' 1 9 However, as we have seen
above, some information must be disclosed in the pre-contractual
information document to all potential franchisees. For example, the
franchisor must disclose the conditions of the transfer of the contract.
Furthermore, antitrust guidelines10 recognize that the franchisee has to
107 Scheck was later overturned and usually disparaged in subsequent case law. See
infra. Scheck has been criticized, ignored, and distinguished in a number of subsequent
opinions. See e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Weaver, 169 F.3d 1310, 1317 (1 1 h Cir. 1999)
(concluding that Scheck's reasoning is illogical and unconvincing); Barnes v. Burger
King Corp., 932 F. Supp. 1420, 1437-38 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (rejecting the Scheck court's
reading of the franchise agreement); accord, Chang v. McDonald's Corp., 105 F.3d 664
( 9 th Cir. 1996) (rejecting the approach of the Vylene case, discussed supra). But see
Charles S. Hale II, Market Impact in the Information Age: Protecting Hotel Owners
from Hotel Management Companies, 108 W. Va. L. Rev. 573, 580 (2005) (noting,
"Although the Scheck opinion has been criticized and distinguished, it has been
followed where franchise agreements are silent as to the rights of franchisors").
'08 C. Civ. 1134 (2008) (trans. by Robert W. Emerson) <Les conventions lgalement
form~es tiennent lieu de loi i ceux qui les ontfaites. Elles doivent etre ex&utdes de
bonnefoi >).
109 ALAINBENABENT, DROIT CIVIL LES OBLIGATIONS 15 (10th ed., Domat, 2005) (droit
priv6, Montchrdtien, «Contrats nomm~s et contrats innomds>>).
110 Commission Regulation 2790/99, On the Application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty
Establishing the European Community to Categories of Vertical Agreements and
Concerted Practices (Vertical Restraints Block Exemption Regulation), 1999 O.J. (L.
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obtain the franchisor's assent before any transfer of franchisee rights and
duties under the franchise contract is made."' If the contract contains no
provisions at all regarding the transfer of that contract, then the nature of
basic French franchise law concepts still inhibits transfer. This is because
the franchise contract is built around essential "personal" characteristics,
such as the licensing of the trade name and the know-how, and the contract
is entered into in consideration of the person of the other party." 2 Indeed,
the franchisor does not want to entrust his most valuable assets to just
anyone, and certainly not to the first candidate who meets whatever
threshold the franchisee has for assigning the contract. Therefore, the
franchisor cannot be forced to work with another contracting party other
than the franchisee with whom he signed the contract. The Cour de
Cassation held, "the fact that a contract has been concluded in consideration
of the person does not prevent the transfer of the latter's rights and duties to
a third party, so as long as the other party has agreed to it."1 3 This decision
has been read a contrario by most French legal practitioners, who
understand that intuitu personae contracts require the consent of the
transferred party to be valid. The decision also means that other types of
contracts do not require such consent.
A similar question arises in the reciprocal situation: Is franchisee
consent required prior to a franchisor's assignment of the contract to a third
party? Case law suggests that the answer to this question is yes. 1 4 The
answer had remained unclear for a long time, until two cases in May 1997.
In one of these cases, decided on May 6, 1997, the Cour de Cassation held
that the Cour d'Appel did not offer a legal basis for its decision when that
lower appellate court failed to consider the transfer issues. 1 5 For a supply
contract between supplier and customer, had the customer agreed to the
substitution of his co-contractor-i.e., to having a different supplier? Such
substitution took place after the court had mandated that the customer, who
had ordered materials from the supplier, pay the costs to another company
336/25) (EC). These are the December 1999 guidelines on vertical restraints, thereby
completing the exemption regulation.
1 See supra Article L330-3 of the Commerce Code.
112 The concept of intuitu persona, in the franchising context, is discussed infra.
113 See Cass. com, Jan. 3, 1992, N'90-14.831 (trans. by Robert W. Emerson) (<Lefait
qu'un contrat ait 4t conclu en consideration de la personne du cocontractant nefait
pas obstacle 6 ce que les droits et obligations de ce dernier soient transftr~s b un tiers
dds lors que l'autre partie y a consenti g).
114 See infra text accompanying notes 114-117 (the discussion of the two French cases
of May 6, 1997).
"5 Cass. com., May 6, 1997, NO96-16.335, <ttendu qu'en se dterminantpar de tels
motifs, sans rechercher si, dans le contrat conclu entre la socit9 CVS et la socit6
Rougeot ou ultrieurement, cette dernidre socigtg avait donng son consentement e la
substitution de sa cocontractante, la cour d'appel n'a pas donna de base lgale b sa
dcision).
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to which the supplier had entrusted the resale of its production." 6 Such
consent to contractual assignment is a fundamental matter of inquiry before
a party, such as a franchisee, may be ordered to deal with someone other
than the original contracting party (e.g., the original franchisor).
In another case, also on May 6, 1997, the Cour de Cassation
reviewed a maintenance contract, reserving to the company in charge of
maintenance the ability to "freely transfer [to another company] . . . the
rights [e.g., profits] and duties coming from . . .the contract."' 17 So, the
high court decided, a lower court was correct in holding that, with this
contractual stipulation giving the maintenance company the complete right
to choose its own substitute, the parties foresaw no need to obtain the
customer's consent, or even inform him, before the maintenance company
proceeded, at some future time, to obtain a substitute; the customer could
not oppose that substitution."'
Combined, these two cases indicate, by analogy, that network
parties, such as franchisor and franchisee, are not simply bound by the
longstanding legal doctrine of intuitu personae. Instead, courts must focus
on the parties' own contract provisions, or lack thereof. For an assignment
from one franchisor to another franchisor, the franchisee must have already
consented contractually (a form of prospective agreement) when the
franchise agreement was formed, or else that franchisee is free to reject the
new franchisor. The intuitu personae factor does not function anymore as a
criterion to determine under which condition the transfer of a contract
should require the franchisee's consent." 9 Franchisors can include in the
contract a provision that allows them to freely transfer the franchise
contract. This is an ab initio authorizing clause, "une clause d'autorisation
ab initio," meaning that, from the very start, the franchisees agreed to the
possibility of the contract's transfer. This clause should cover the methods
in which the franchisees will be informed of the transfer, and of the identity
of the new franchisor. 1
20
In the United States, the franchisor typically insists on a clause
reserving to it the right to assign the contract-the franchise agreement thus
expressly states that the contract is freely transferrable from one franchisor
to another.' 2' Interestingly, almost all of the franchisors deny this right to
116 Cass. com., May 6, 1997, No. 96-16.335.
117 Cass. com., May 6, 1997, No. 95-10.252 («Un contrat de maintenance ayant riservi
6 l'entreprise charg~e de celle-ci lafaculti de librement cider... les droits et
obligations issus du ... contrat ou substituer toute sociti de son choix dans le bnefice
des droits et la charge des obligations en risultant ).
1s Id. («Un tribunal retientjustement, en se refdrant b cette stipulation contractuelle de
substitution qui ne privoyait ni 1information du client ni un agriment par lui, que le
client ne pouvait s'opposer ci son application ).
1'9 See Les Petites Affiches, 9 Novembre, 2006, N°224, p. 30, §82.
120Id. at 31, §89.
12 1 Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Contract Clauses, supra note 84, at 970 (66% of the
contracts in 1993 provided for such transferability); Robert W. Emerson, Franchise
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their franchisees.' 2 2 With such non-reciprocity, it is clear that the intuitu
personae concept would be, at least in practice, truly an alien idea to most
American franchisors. After all, these franchisors tend to insist that the
contract covers everything, even allowing for a new franchisor to be
imposed on the franchisee without the franchisee's prior or subsequent
assent. That is the situation, those franchisors reason, because the
franchisee's concurrence was already obtained via the original franchise
agreement.
In France, franchisors can require, specifically in the "clause
d'agr~ment," or agreement clause, that they have rights of approval over the
franchisee's successor. 123 For example, a boilerplate clause recommended
by franchise lawyer and author Jean-Marie Leloup asserts: "[t]he present
contract is not transferrable except for a franchisee's passing on his
goodwill to a successor, provided that the franchisor approves this
successor-candidate .... The franchisor is the sole judge of the candidate's
chances of success, and his ability to reproduce faithfully the transferred
know-how.' 24 Despite its negative form, this formulation does recognize
the transferability of the contract. Moreover, such a clause may safeguard
the network's longevity without interfering with the franchisee's freedom to
sell his goodwill with the trade name. 125 Nevertheless, in that case, the
purchaser has to be the franchisee's successor to his goodwill.
2. Goodwill
In France, until 2002, goodwill was considered solely the property
of the franchisor. 26 This put French franchisees in a difficult position vis-
Phrasing, supra note 84 (77% of the contracts in 2008 provided for such
transferability).
122 Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Contract Clauses, supra note 84, at 969 (95% of the
contracts in 1993 reserving to the franchisor a right of first refusal on the franchisee's
proposed transfer/sale of the franchise to another party; 93% of the contracts in 1993-
and almost as many, 83% in 1971-requiring that the franchisee obtain the franchisor's
approval before selling, assigning or otherwise transferring the franchise); Robert W.
Emerson, Franchise Phrasing, supra note 83 (100% of the contracts in 2008 reserving
to the franchisor a right of first refusal on the franchisee's proposed transfer/sale of the
franchise to another party; 99% of the contracts in 2008 requiring that the franchisee
obtain the franchisor's approval before selling, assigning or otherwise transferring the
franchise).
123 LELOUP, supra note 10, at 267 (para. 1508). Clauses soumettant la transmission du
contrat b l'agrdment dufranchiseur (Provisions conditioning the transfer of the contract
to the franchisor's agreement).
124 Id. (trans. by Robert W. Emerson) (<Le present contrat est intransmissible saufau
successeur dufranchis dans son fonds de commerce 6 condition que ce successeur ait
&e agrg prdalablement par lefranchiseur, seuljuge des chances de succes du
candidat et de son aptitude ei ritdrerfiddlement le savoir-faire transmis>).
125 Franchise Magazine Contrats de Franchise, D~crypter les clauses, Laure Guiserix
(Franchise Contracts, To Decipher the Clauses), Avril/Mai 2007, N° 199.
126 See Cass. com, Mar. 27, 2002 (described below in note 127),
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A-vis the landowners of their commercial premises, who often refused to
renew leases on the grounds that the franchisees were not the owners of the
goodwill.
127
The Cour de Cassation put an end to the franchisee's predicament
with a decision (called the arr&t Tr~visan) on March 27, 2002.128 The Court
recognized that the franchisor is the owner of the national clientele, whereas
the franchisee is the owner of the local clientele. 129 This meant that all
franchisees were the owners of the goodwill on the local scale.
Therefore, taking into account the importance of their local clientele,
the franchisee owner of the goodwill can either benefit from the renewal right
of the commercial lease, or can be granted an important eviction indemnity.
However, as can be seen in a 2007 decision where the court decided that the
franchisee was still entitled to the goodwill, 130 this position still needs to be
reaffirmed by the court. Indeed, even though franchisees had won in the past,
some landowners still continued to ignore the franchisee's goodwill rights.' 3'
127 The decree of Sept. 30, 1953, regulates in France the relationship between the lessor
and the lessee in regard to the renewal of the commercial leases. This decree has just
been integrated into the 'Code de commerce', in Mar. 25, 2007, under the Articles L
145-5 to L 145-60. Under now Article L 145-8 of the Code de commerce, the
commercial lease renewal right can only be asked by the owner of the goodwill (fonds
de commerce).
127See Cass. com, Mar. 27, 2002. A lessor, the owner of a commercial lease, delivered a
refusal of renewal to his lessees. The lessor said that the franchisee did not indicate that
it had its own clientele, linked to its professional activity and independent of its
attractiveness due to the franchisor trade name. Consequently, it could not justify the
contention that it had its own goodwill, and left the franchisee unable to insist on a right
to benefit from the commercial lease status (which extended only to the goodwill
holder, the franchisor)The court affirmed, "if the clientele is at the national level,
attached to the notoriety of the franchisor's trade name, the local clientele only exists by
the fact of the means put in work by the franchisee, including the corporal elements of
its goodwill, stock, materials.., and the incorporeal element, that is the commercial
lease. This clientele is itself a part of the goodwill of the franchisee, because, even
though the latter is not the owner of the trade name put at his disposition during the
execution of the franchise contract, it is created by its activity, with means that he puts
at work at his own risks, because contracting personally with the suppliers or investors].
129 Id..
130 See Cass. com, Oct. 9, 2007: pourvoi n' 05-14118. The lower court had decided
that the franchisee was not entitled to damages for the loss of his customers because the
franchisee could not bring any proofs that could be put in direct and necessary relation
with the franchisor. The Cour de Cassation said that the lower court had however
recognized that the franchisee could claim its own customers and that the termination of
the contract was due to the franchisor, from what it could be deduced that the former
franchisee became dispossessed from its customers. Therefore, the franchisee was
entitled to recover from this loss.
131 Interview with Monique Ben Soussen, avocat, Paris, France (June 13, 2008);
interview with Hubert Bensoussan, avocat, Nantes and Paris, France (June 17, 2008);
interview with Serge Meresse, avocat, Paris, France (June 17, 2008).
2009]
346 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 3:2
JOURNAL
As owners of the local goodwill, the franchisees can decide to transfer
it. This represents a threat to the franchisor. Indeed, for the sake of the
network, the placement of the franchised stores is of substantial importance
because the franchisors want to preserve existing stores. Therefore, in order to
prevent such a loss, they often include a provision called a preference clause
(oclause de preference >). Under a preference clause, a franchisee, in the event
he or she decides to sell merchandise, commits to giving priority to the
franchisor, who thus enjoys a preemptive right under predetermined
conditions. Hence, with a preference clause in the franchise contract,
whenever the franchisee decides to sell his goodwill, the franchisor will be the
first person to whom the sale is offered. If the franchisor does not accept the
offer, then the franchisee is free to sell his goodwill to any other potential
buyer. 132
A 2005 appellate court decision illustrates this mechanism. 133 In
that case, a franchisor, aware of the offer made by the franchisee through
the preference clause, did not exercise his preemptive right to acquire the
goodwill. 34 After denial of purchase by the franchisor, the franchisee sold
his goodwill to another party. 135  The franchisor then filed a complaint
against the new goodwill owner because that owner did not follow the
original franchise contract's requirements. 136 The appellate court said that
the franchise contract had been terminated by the transfer of the goodwill,
and hence the franchisor could only sue the original franchisee for damages,
not the successive purchaser of the goodwill. 37 The new owner of the
goodwill had explicitly agreed that he would not pursue the franchise
contract. 138
Some law practitioners believe that the transfer of a goodwill
amputated from the franchise contract should barely be called a true
goodwill sale. 139 Their thesis is that goodwill is created by the clientele for
which it exists. Therefore, a goodwill sale happens only when the elements
that attract the clientele are transferred. They suggest that franchisors
132 In essence, the preference clause functions similarly to a right-of-first-refusal. See
CA Nimes, Sept. 8, 2005, unpublished, RG n'03/03202. In this case, a franchisor,
aware of the offer made by the franchisee through the preference clause, did not request
the acquisition of the goodwill. The franchisee then sold his goodwill to a successor.
The franchisor then complained against the new goodwill owner because he did not
pursue the franchise contract. The appellate court said that the franchise contract had
been terminated by the transfer of the goodwill, and hence the franchisor could only sue
the franchisee for damages and not the purchaser of the goodwill.






139 Les Petites Affiches, La Loi, Le Quotidien Juridique, Nov. 9, 2006, N'224, page 32-
33.
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should, in every contract, put a preference clause and an agreement clause
(the franchisors need to be part of, and determine authorization for or
against, any franchise transfer to a third party). That way, the franchisor's
approval of the transferee is still required, and the franchisee will not be
freed from the contract by the franchisor's rejection of his offer. However,
this reasoning will be hard to reconcile with decisions similar to the
appellate court's holding. Indeed, the appellate court's decision clearly
shows that the franchisor had no legitimate claim upon the transferee of the
goodwill once the former had refused an offer under the preference clause.
Protection against such a circumstance could be reached through a
franchisor-franchisee contract provision that goodwill may only be
transferred in conjunction with a transfer of the franchise contract itself.
As for the franchisees, they can transfer the franchise contract and
the goodwill through a clause called the "free circulation clause, under
termination if unsatisfactory performance" (oClause de libre - circulation,
sous condition r~solutoire de performance ): Under these circumstances
the franchise contract and the goodwill (afonds de commerce>)), ordinarily
non-transferable without first obtaining the franchisor's approval, can be
freely transferred from the franchisee to the franchisee's successor; the
franchisor is instead reserved a period - generally, several months - to
judge the transferee's abilities working within the franchised network and,
thus, to decide whether to confirm the transfer. Because of the uncertainties
of such a trial period, careful transferees seek a stipulation for returning
money to them from the franchisee in the event of a non-confirmation that
is not the transferee's fault. Indeed, these clauses are rare,1 40 undoubtedly
due to the difficulties and insecurity for the transferee as well as the
increased oversight required of the franchisor.
In the United States, as in France, court decisions have shown some
inconsistencies in deciding whether the goodwill is severable or not, and
hence there is uncertainty in determining the ownership of the franchise
goodwill. 14 1  In Bray v. QFA Royalties LLC, the court granted the
franchisee's motion for preliminary injunction and prohibited Quiznos from
terminating a franchisee for conduct that in Quiznos's "sole judgment"
materially impaired its goodwill. 42 The court was presented with two types
of goodwill: 1) the "business goodwill," or also referred to the "community
goodwill," which the franchisees argued they would lose if Quiznos was
allowed to terminate; and 2) the goodwill associated with the Quiznos
brand (trademark goodwill), which Quiznos argued would be materially
140See LELOUP, supra note 10, at 267 (para. 1507).
141 See e.g., Arnott v. American Oil Co., 609 F.2d 873, 882 (8th Cir. 1979); Lee v.
Exxon Co, 867 F. Supp. 365, 366 (D.S.C. 1994); Bray v. QFA Royalties LLC, 486 F.
Supp. 2d 1237 (D. Colo. 2007); Pirtek USA, LLC v. Zaetz, 408 F. Supp. 2d 81, 81 (D.
Conn. 2005); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Razumic, 390 A.2d 736, 742 (Pa. 1979). All
these cases are discussed in the text in the following two paragraphs.
142 486 F. Supp. 2d 1237, 1237 (D. Colo. 2007)
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impaired if the termination was not immediate. 143 The court granted the
franchisee's motion and said that to allow Quiznos to terminate the
franchise agreement would cause irreparable harm to the franchisee's
"community goodwill." 144  The court further found that there was
insufficient evidence to show that a continued relationship between
Quiznos and the franchisee would cause further material harm to Quiznos'
trademark goodwill. 45  In so ruling, the court implicitly recognized the
ownership of the two different, but related, types of goodwill-the
"community goodwill" owned by the franchisee and the trademark
goodwill owned by the franchisor. Moreover, in Pirtek USA, LLC v. Zaetz,
the franchisor moved for a preliminary injunction to enforce a non-compete
agreement with Zaetz, an ex-franchisee. 146 Pirtek, the franchisor, alleged
that Zaetz illegally transferred the goodwill he developed as a Pirtek
franchisee to his son who opened a competing business in place of Zaetz,
thereby violating the non-compete agreement between Pirtek and Zaetz.
147
The court denied Pirtek's motion. It reasoned partly that Pirtek's goodwill
was continuing to be developed through a new Pirtek franchise in the same
territory and, therefore, any loss in goodwill as a result of the Zaetz's son's
opening a competing business at the former Pirtek site did not amount to
irreparable harm. 148 Similar to Bray, the court seems to have recognized
that a franchisee can further develop a franchisor's trademark goodwill.
However, contrary to Bray, the court here seems to imply that, ultimately,
all goodwill belongs to the franchisor.
In Arnott v. American Oil Co., 149 the Eighth Circuit stated that
goodwill is owned jointly by the franchisor and the franchisee. The Court
reasoned that the franchisee is the common builder of both his own
goodwill, and the franchisor's goodwill. 150 However, other cases show that
the issue remains unsolved.1 51 In Lee v. Exxon CO, 15 2 when the franchisor
141 d. at 1249-50.
144 Id. at 1249.
145 Id. at 1250-51.
146 408 F. Supp. 2d 81, 81 (D. Conn. 2005).
147 Id. at 81, 84.
148 Id. at 86.
149 Arnott v. American Oil Co., 609 F.2d 873, 882 (8th Cir. 1979).
150 Id.
... There are, for example, cases holding against the franchisee's holding any goodwill.
See, e.g., Gorenstein Enterprises, Inc. v. Quality Care-USA, Inc., 874 F.2d 431, 435-
439 (7th Cir. 1989) (in ruling that franchisor Quality Care properly terminated the
Gorensteins' franchise for failure to pay royalties, the court's discussion suggests that
the goodwill associated with Quality Care's trademark could not be separated from the
franchisor and that, therefore, the franchisor had the right to maintain complete control
over the goodwill); Int'l Multifoods Corp. and Affiliate Cos. v. Comm'r., 108 T.C. 25
(1997) (discussed infra text accompanying notes 154-159); Canterbury v. Comm'r, 99
T.C. 223, 249 (1992) ("We find that petitioners [franchisees] acquired no goodwill that
was separate and apart from the goodwill inherent in the McDonald's franchise"); Lieb
v. Comm'r, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 123 1, at 8th para. (1974) ("we are firmly convinced that
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decided not to renew the agreement, a franchisee had no choice but to buy
the goodwill that he had been developing. The franchisor's action was in
favor of the non-interested party; therefore, such action did not take into
account the franchisee's circumstances, but that of the future buyer of
goodwill.1 53 Compare with Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Razumic, 54 where the
court decided that the franchisee was creating goodwill for the franchise
and afortiori creating goodwill for both the franchisor and himself. Thus,
the goodwill issues remain unresolved in many situations and before many
courts.
These inconsistent decisions are a result of the different
characteristics that goodwill has been given. For example, in Int'l
Multifoods Corp. and Affiliate Cos. v. Comm 'r,155 franchisors argued that
goodwill was included in the franchise package in cases involving
termination, trademark infringement, antitrust tying, and taxes.'5 6 The
Court in that case held that the goodwill inherent in the Mister Donut
business in Asia and the Pacific was embodied in, and inseverable from, the
franchisor's interest and trademarks that were conveyed to the defendant;
the income attributable to the sale of P's franchisor's interest and trademarks
constitutes U.S. source income. In International Multifoods Corp., the
franchisor sold its franchisor's interest, along with any goodwill, to a
Japanese corporation, Duskin Company.' 57 The franchisor claimed that the
goodwill was severable from the franchise and should be considered foreign
source income for tax purposes. 58 The IRS argued that goodwill cannot be
severed from the franchise and that any sale attributable to the franchise is
U.S. source income.' 59 Here, the court held that the goodwill was
inseparable from the franchise. 160 It reasonably follows, according to the
court's position, that the franchisor's former franchisees purchased a
franchise package that included goodwill.
Radio [the franchisee] had no goodwill to sell. This Court has previously held that
where, as here, a business sells brand name products pursuant to a nontransferable
franchise which is terminable at will by the franchisor upon sufficient notice, the
franchisee can possess no goodwill, for goodwill, if any, is inextricably connected to
the franchise and ceases to exist when the franchise terminates"). For a general
discussion of the issues, see Benjamin A. Levin & Richard S. Morrison, Who Owns
Goodwill at the Franchised Location? 18 FRANCHISE L.J. 85 (1999).
152 Lee v. Exxon Co, 867 F. Supp. 365, 366 (D.S.C. 1994).
'
53 Id. at 368.
154 Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Razumic, 390 A.2d 736, 742 (Pa. 1979).
115 Int'l Multifoods Corp. and Affiliate Cos. v. Comm'r., 108 T.C. 25 (1997).
156 But see Drexel v. Union Prescription Ctr., Inc., 582 F.2d 781, 786 (3d Cir.1979),
where the franchisor argued that goodwill is severable and retained by the franchisor in
cases involving termination, vicarious liability, and taxes.
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3. Comparing to Transfers of the Franchise Contract in the
United States
In the United States, there are two basic types of laws that restrict
the franchisor's ability to withhold consent to the transfer of a franchise.
The first type is found in three states - Arkansas, Nebraska, and
New Jersey - and it primarily requires the franchisee to request the
franchisor's consent and to disclose information about the prospective
transferee. 161 The approval is assumed to have been granted by the
franchisor, unless within sixty days it gives reasons for objection, which
can only be for a material reason relating to the proposed transferee's
character, business experience, or financial ability. 162 A fourth state, Iowa,
has the most comprehensive statute on franchisee transfers, one providing
that the franchisee is permitted to transfer its franchise, subject only to the
franchisor's imposition of its "reasonable current qualifications" for new
franchisees; there must be "a legitimate business reason" for these
franchisor-mandated prerequisites, and the Iowa franchise relationship
enumerates three conditions a franchisor may impose upon a transfer:
satisfaction of any amounts due to the franchisor or its affiliates, successful
completion of a training program, and the payment of a reasonable transfer
fee. 163 Also, according to court interpretation of the California and
Michigan franchise laws, the franchisor can demand that the franchises
provide the franchisor with a release; otherwise, the franchisee would have
failed to cure a default in the franchise contract and can be kept from
transferring the franchise. 1
64
The second type of statute found in a few American states requires
"good cause" in order for a franchisor to withhold consent to a transfer. 165
Hawaii, for example, specifies that good cause exists when the franchisee
161 The mandated information includes the transferee's name, address, statement of
financial qualifications, and business experience during the past five years. ARK. CODE
ANN. § 4-72-205 (2008); NEB. REV. STAT. § 87-405 (2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:10-6
(2008).
162 Id. Moreover, under New Jersey law, the franchisor's rejection of a proposed
transfer may have to meet a reasonableness standard. In re Headquarters Dodge, Inc.,
13 F.3d 674 (3d Cir. 1993).
163 IOWA CODE §§ 523H.5, 537A.10(5) (2008). Training programs are typical features of
franchising. Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Phrasing, supra note 84 (finding that, as of
2008, 98% of surveyed franchise agreements expressly provided for training and that 66%
further stated that the training was to be at the franchisee's expense). Likewise customary
is the fee that a franchisee must pay the franchisor for transferring the franchise to someone
else - a fee separate from any amounts due the franchisor from the proposed new
franchisee. Id. (96% of surveyed franchise agreements have such a fee, with the most
common amount being $5,000, but almost half charging more than that amount).
164 Alberts v. Southland Corp., Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) 10,873 (S.D. Cal. 1996);
Franchise Management Unlimited, Inc. v. America's Favorite Chicken, 561 N.W.2d
(Mich. Ct. App. 1997), order vacated on other grounds, 590 N.W.2d 570 (1999).
165 See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 482E-6(2)(1) (2008); MICH. COMp. LAWS § 445.1527(g)
(2008); MINN. STAT. § 80C. 14, subd 5 (2008).
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or its proposed transferee has failed to pay sums already due or to cure any
outstanding defaults, or when the proposed transferee is a competitor of the
franchisor or has not met the franchisor's reasonable qualifications and
obligations; under the Hawaiian statute, the franchisor only has thirty days
to approve or disapprove a transfer, with the franchisor obliged to assert in
writing the reasons for any disapproval.1
66
Note that this "good cause" concept is not implemented in France,
where the withholding of transfer is discretionary (according to the Cour de
Cassation, it is merely subject to an a posteriori control of any abuse of that
right). 167 Therefore, only in France, and not in states using this type of
statute, can the franchisor avoid explaining his motivation for withholding
consent-that is, unless such an explanation is expressly required in the
contract, something that is highly unlikely. 
68
When there is no state statute that requires the franchisee to obtain
the franchisor's approval of a proposed transfer, the franchisor presumably
has the right to disapprove a transfer only if that right is set forth in the
franchise agreement; however, this franchisor power is so commonplace,
indeed so close to being a universal contract provision, that its absence may
leave one questioning the competence of franchisor's counsel for its
omission. 169 It is hard to imagine a franchisor not reserving unto itself the
166 HAW. REV. STAT. § 482E-6(2)(I) (2008). Under the Arkansas, Nebraska, or New
Jersey statutes, if, within sixty days after receiving notice of the franchisee's intent to
transfer the franchise, the franchisor has not acted, then the franchisor's approval is
deemed granted. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-72-205 (2008); NEB. REV. STAT. § 87-405
(2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:10-6 (2008).
167 See PIERRE MOUSSERON, ET AL.,TECHNIQUE CONTRACTUELLE 482, 1246 (Editions
Francis Lefebvre 2005).
168 Cass. com, July 2, 2002, Juris-Data N'015113. Holding about a concession contract,
expressly concluded intuitu personae, submitting the transfer to a third party to the
agreement of the franchisor, who committed himself to «fairly examine and with all the
care required the proposed change and to communicate quickly his decision to the
concessionary that the appellate court could deduce that the refusal must have been
justified by requirements related to the safeguard of the legitimate commercial interest,
and that, to avoid all arbitrary decision, it belonged to him to motivate it, for the only
purpose to allow the concessionary to verify that the decision was grounded on a fair
and careful examination, in conformity with his contractual commitments. <<Mais
attendu qu'ayant relev que le contrat de concession, express~ment conclu intuitu
personae, prdvoyait que son transfert au profit d'un tiers 9tait subordonn h l'agr~ment
du conc~dant et que ce dernier s'jtait engag 6 "examiner iquitablement et avec tout le
soin requis le changement proposg et communiquer rapidement sa dcision au
concessionnaire", la cour d'appel a pu en dduire que le refus d'agr~ment par le
conc dant devait ;tre justifi par des impratifs tenant b la sauvegarde de ses intrts
commerciaux lgitimes et que, pour &viter tout arbitraire, il lui appartenait de le
motiver, c6 seule fin de permettre au concessionnaire de vrifier que sa dcision tait
fond~e sur un examen o quitable et soigneux, conforme c6 ses engagements
contractuels >>.
169 See Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Contract Clauses, supra note 84, at 948.
(determining that, as of 1993, 95% of surveyed franchise contracts had franchisor right-
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right to disapprove of franchise transfers, such as when the transferee fails
to meet specified criteria, including good moral character and business
reputation, good credit rating, adequate financial resources, and prior
experience. Additionally, a franchisor can always merely deny the transfer
through the franchisor's right to deny any transfer. In that case, the
franchisor provides the contract with a provision clearly stating that no
transfer will be approved. Perhaps the absence of significant case law is a
sign that the transfer option is barely used, although just as probable are
conclusions that do not result in meaningful, appellate litigation.
A franchisor can also condition the transfer on the satisfaction of
requirements imposed upon the transferor and the transferee.'
70
Unfortunately, there are very few cases that can illustrate this situation.
Similarly, in France, a franchisor can include a right of first refusal in the
contract, giving it sufficient time to evaluate an offer and determine
whether he wishes to take the offer. 71 This right is included in a great
majority of French franchise contracts. 72
From all these dispositions, it is interesting to note that at no point
is the expression "intuitu personae" mentioned in American law. However,
it seems obvious that the concept of the franchise contract being concluded
in consideration of the person is embodied in the American legal system.
Indeed, whenever a provision states that the franchisor has the right to
disapprove a transfer, such as the one stipulating the "right of first refusal,"
the concept of "intuitu personae" is present, in spirit if not in actual word
usage, and the franchisor can decide whether the prospective new
franchisee will qualify as a franchisee. Now, the question of whether it is
of-first-refusal clauses); Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Phrasing, supra note 84
(finding that, as of 2008, 100% of surveyed franchise agreements either outright prohibited
a franchisee's transferring the franchise or had a provision mandating that the franchisee
must obtain the franchisor's approval before selling, assigning or otherwise transferring the
franchise; further finding that 100% of surveyed franchise agreements granted to the
franchisor a right of first refusal on the franchisee's proposed transfer/sale of the franchise
to another party).
170 Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Phrasing, supra note 84.
... The right-of-first-refusal clause, granted to the franchisor by the franchisee, is
termed a "pacte de preference" and is a well understood and accepted part of French
franchise contracting and jurisprudence. LELOUP, supra note 10, at 273-274 & 273 n. 1
(citing formbooks, treatises, and court decisions).
72 Simon Associ~s (a Paris law firm specializing in franchise law), La Lettre de la
Franchise, mai-juin 2007, at 1, available at
http://www.franchisenet.fr/ obj/AB32557B-5FOA-4E83-
A8366755A3AC9A6E/outline/Lettre FranchiseSimonAssocies MaiJuin.pdf. (in
discussing two recent Cour de Cassation commercial cases, states that the franchisor's
right of first refusal allows the franchisor, as owner of the trademark, to maintain its
position and preserving its network; "[t]he clause giving a preference to the franchisor
when transferring the franchise business is very common" (trans. by Robert W.
Emerson) ; accord, LE TOURNEAU, supra note 15, at 259-260).
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reciprocal or not has never been debated in U.S. courts; rather, it seems to
be managed contractually.
IV. CONCLUSION
Both franchise contracts and the legal framework in France and the
United States governing such contracts do not differ much.173 We have
seen that the most important phase of the contract, which is closely
regulated by both countries, is in fact the phase preceding the actual
signature of the contract: the disclosure of the pre-contractual information.
This is indeed what guarantees the success of the franchise business, as it
provides a protection for the franchisee, and in the end, the consumer.
Furthermore, we can say that both French and American franchise contracts
have their specificities and nuances. However, American franchise law and
practice still strongly influence France, particularly on exclusivity and
encroachment. The new trend appears to be an abandonment of what once
was a predominant clause, the provision establishing exclusive territories.
So, rather than contractually stipulated market protections, the more
amorphous concept of encroachment, drawing mainly from tort law and
implied contract terms, may already have become the burning, new issue
for French franchise law, fifteen years after American law reached and then
quickly dismissed many of the same rationales for finding and then
punishing alleged encroachment. While this new contractual practice -
non-territoriality - may be harmful to some franchisees, it may have long-
term benefits for the franchise system, at least once the legal issues of
encroachment have played themselves out.
173 As Ann-Cecile Benoit, a Parisian franchisee advocate notes, often the language and
principles to arrive at a result are different in French and American law, while the
results reached are far less distinct. Interview with Ann-Cecile Benoit, avocat, Paris,
France (June 17, 2008). Different paths to the same destination, one might say.
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